Are we using the wrong design fires for tall building fire strategies, in light of recent full height fires?

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## **Objective:**

- Look at the bigger picture
- Encourage critical review
- Stimulate discussion



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- Look at the bigger picture
- Encourage critical review
- Stimulate discussion

## Not looking to:

- Review cladding panels
- Discuss individual incidents
- Point fingers
- Get overly technical



#### **Overview**

- A recap: What are we trying to achieve?
- Tall buildings
  - How are we faring?
  - Are we ready for the future?
- Tall buildings fire safety strategies
  - Key principles
  - The impact of multi-level fires
- Multi-level fires: a warning sign?



a recap

# what are we trying to achieve?



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Institution of Fire Engineers (IFE):

"...protect people, property and the environment from the destructive effects of fire"





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### In practice...

Deliver a solution that meets goals (and obligations) within the relevant constraints





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Deliver a solution that meets goals (and obligations) within the relevant constraints







## Acceptability of overall design



"...intended to provide guidance for some of the more common building situations"

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otherwise...

## Acceptability of elements, systems

Designed, installed and maintained in accordance with...

- Industry standards (e.g. BS, EN, LPC)
- Manufacturer's guidelines
- Requirements of the fire safety strategy











## Acceptability of products, materials

Designed, installed and maintained in accordance with...

- Industry standards (e.g. BS, EN, LPC)
- Manufacturer's guidelines
- Requirements of the fire safety strategy





## Acceptability of management

- Experience
  - Individual
  - Collective
- Risk assessment
- Feedback loop





## How have these methods evolved?

- Build what we want or need
- Weaknesses highlighted by failures, and commonly tragedies
- Revisit and improve the process when risk is not longer tolerable
- Over time, acceptable concepts emerge

























#### **Reactive evolution**



### **Reactive evolution**











## So, what exactly are we trying to achieve?

"...securing reasonable standards of health and safety for persons in and about buildings..."

"...protect people, property and the environment from the destructive effects of fire"





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"...securing reasonable standards of health and safety for persons in and about buildings..."

"...protect people, property and the environment from the destructive effects of fire"





## What are the "effects of fire"? How do we test our strategies against them?



### **Test fires**

- Standardised conditions & performance criteria
- Intended as comparative metrics, not to represent 'real' fires
- Small scale to full-scale assemblies
- e.g.
  - standard fire test (BS 476, ISO 834)
  - combustibility test
  - surface spread of flame test Trenton Fire





## Design fire scenarios

- Conceptual "effects of fire" not defined in terms of severity
- Characterised by location, likely area 'affected', growth rate, etc.
- Inform the strategy, provisions & response for evacuation, containment, mgmt., firefighting, etc.



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## Design fires – prescriptive approach

- Standard approaches based on science, experience, tests, etc.
- Usually intended as conservative representations of 'real' fires
- Standard performance criteia
- e.g.
  - Structural FR standard fire
  - Façade unprotected areas steady state radiator (e.g. BR 187)



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## Design fires – performance-based approach

- More accurate representations of 'real' fires
- Consider characteristics of the building, fire load, etc.
- Appraise:
  - Fire and smoke movement
  - Temperature development
  - Heat transfer & thermomechanical response







## What constitutes reasonable safety?

- If we "pass" under the relevant "fire effects"...
  - Safety achieved... right?
  - We know this... due to precedent...?
- Are the "fire effect" representations appropriate?
- Is there sufficient precedent?

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Scale of building

tall buildings

# how are we faring?



## A lot done. A lot more to do?

- UK: so far so good...
- Globally: not so good?
  - Some loss of life
  - Significant property damage
- Risks being identified, appraised and addressed as they emerge
- Will this be enough?

09:50 - 10:20 Is there a Fire Safety Problem with Tall Building Facades? Andrew Kay - Siderise

10:20 - 10:50 A Forensic Examination of Tall Building Façade fires Martin Edwards – Probyn-Miers

11:10 - 11:40 Are we using the Wrong Design Fires for Tall Building Fire Strategies in light of recent full height fires? Eoin O'Loughlin – Trenton Fire

11:40 - 12:10 Should Lifts be used for Evacuation of Tall Buildings? Santeri Suoranta & Sasha Brozek – Kone

12:10 - 12:30 Q&A

12:30 - 14:00 Visit FIREX Exhibition and Lunch Break

14:00 - 14:30 Protective Security Advances UK Government Security Adviser, CPNI

14:30 - 15:00 Is Stay Put/Remain in Place strategy in Residential Tall Buildings valid? Tom Gilbert – Frankham RMS

15:00 – 15:30 The role of Passive Fire Protection in Tall Buildings Wilf Butcher - AFSP

15:30 - 16:00 Can we Fight and Extinguish Full Height Tall Building Fires?

Mark Fishlock – Horizonscan



Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat










### Home World Manhattan Park Row Singer Metropoli-Woolworth **Bank of** Chrysler **Empire State One World** Sears Tower **Petronas Towers** Taipei 101 **Burj Khalifa** Insurance Building Life Building Building tan Life Building Manhattan Building Building **Trade Center** Chicago 1&2 Taipei Dubai **Building**<sup>2</sup> New York 1974 Kuala Lumpur 2004 Building New York Building New York New York Tower New York New York New York 2010 1998 Chicago 1890 New York 1899 1908 New York 1913 New York 1930 1931 1972 442m 508m 828m 1894 119m 187m 241m 1930 319m 381m 417m 1451ft 452m 1885 94m 1909 1667ft 2717 ft 213m 792ft 283m 1483ft 55m 309ft 106m 391ft 612ft 1046ft 1250ft 1368ft 180ft 348ft 700ft 927ft +39m +13m +39ft +43ft +136ft +71% +13% +12% +57% +14% +13% +17% +13% +19% +9% +2% +12% +63%

History of the "World's Tallest Building"

<sup>1</sup>While the Home Insurance Building was never the tallest building in the world, it is considered the first skyscraper constructed (framed/non-loadbearing façade construction) and thus the first "tall building" as defined by the CTBUH. <sup>2</sup>Now known as The Trump Building, "Bank of Manhattan Building" was the building's title when it was the "World's Tallest Building" <sup>3</sup>Now known as Willis Tower, "Sears Tower" was the building's title when it was the "World's Tallest Building"

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tall buildings

## fire safety strategies

















 Evacuate floors at risk (phased, 2 at a time)





- Evacuate floors at risk (phased, 2 at a time)
- Restrict fire & smoke spread in the building





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- Evacuate floors at risk (phased, 2 at a time)
- Restrict fire & smoke spread in the building
- Prevent collapse
- Prevent fire spread to other properties / parts of the building
- Provide firefighting access and facilities



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# How do multi-level fires impact on fire safety strategies?



How do they compare with the fire events / effects we design for?























- Egress philosophy?
  - 'Defend in place'
  - Phased
- Egress provisions?
  - Alternative routes
  - Capacities
  - Merging flows
- Cause & effect?
  - Detection & alarm
  - Smoke control systems
- Interaction with firefighting access?
- Fire safety mgmt.?









### Impact of multi-level fires – suppression

- e.g. sprinklers, watermist
- Typically designed to address a single seat of fire
  - Number of heads
  - Discharge density
  - Duration (stored water)





### Impact of multi-level fires – suppression

- e.g. sprinklers, watermist
- Typically designed to address a single seat of fire
  - Number of heads
  - Discharge density
  - Duration (stored water)
- Multiple fire locations...
  - More heads…
  - Sufficient water?
  - Sufficient pressure?
  - Successful suppression?





### Impact of multi-level fires – suppression





- Fire resistance design
  - e.g. beams, columns, slabs, load-bearing walls
  - Performance benchmarked by testing isolated elements under standard furnace tests





Figure 4: General arrangement for BS 476 fire tests on loaded columns

- Fire resistance furnace test for columns
- Single, isolated, short-span (and non-combustible...) element





- Fire resistance test for beams
- Single, isolated, short-span (and non-combustible...) element



Figure 3: General arrangement for BS 476 fire tests on beams

- Fire resistance design
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- Fire resistance design
  - e.g. beams, columns, slabs, load-bearing walls
  - Performance benchmarked by testing isolated elements under standard furnace tests
- Unforeseen fire effects?
  - Exposure on more sides
  - Pre-heating
- Global (second order) structural effects?
  - More thermal expansion
  - Impact on end restraints
  - Eccentric loads
  - Contraction in cooling



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### Impact of multi-level fires – structure





### Impact of multi-level fires - external spread



### Impact of multi-level fires - external spread

Floor-to-floor compartmentation breached – significantly more radiation observed





### Impact of multi-level fires – external spread





### Impact of multi-level fires – fire brigade

- Access and facilities
- Both firefighting and rescue operations
- Some key principles
  - One seat of fire

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- Fire should not readily spread downwards
- Fire spread upwards should be restricted



## Impact of multi-level fires - fire brigade

- Access and facilities
- Both firefighting and rescue operations
- Some key principles
  - One seat of fire
  - Fire should not readily spread downwards
  - Fire spread upwards should be restricted
- Multi-level fires
  - Decision-making challenges
  - Operational challenges
  - Interaction with evacuation
  - Safety of firefighters



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### Impact of multi-level fires – fire brigade



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### Impact of multi-level fires – others...

 Residential corridor smoke extract systems



Atrium smoke
control systems





### So, what can we say about multi-level fires?

- Not generally considered in design
- Invalidate many aspects of our fire safety strategies
- Consequences can be high
- Exacerbated in tall buildings



## But we already know this...

- Fire spread between floors takes time
- We put measures in place to mitigate the rate of spread
  - Compartmentation
  - Fire-stopping
  - Spandrels

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- Cavity barriers
- Surface spread of flame limits
- Combustibility limits
- Overall performance



BR 135 (BRE, 2013)

## However, if we get just one aspect wrong...

- Fire spread between floors takes time
- We put measures in place to mitigate the rate of spread
  - Compartmentation
  - Fire-stopping
  - Spandrels
  - Cavity barriers
  - Surface spread of flame limits
  - Combustibility limits
  - Overall performance







### multi-level façade fires

# a warning sign?





# Highlighting a wider issue

- Single failures or oversights can have far-reaching impacts for a fire safety strategy
- Greater uncertainty, greater consequence what is the risk?
- Can we afford to be reactive?
- What else should we be considering / questioning?







### Wind-driven fires







## **Travelling fires**







### Fires in timber frame buildings







### What can we do?

- To ensure risk is:
  - acceptable
  - commensurate with scale
- To ensure strategies are:
  - appropriate for tall buildings
  - followed through in construction
- To ensure suitability / validity of:
  - test fires
  - design fire scenarios
  - design fires prescriptive
  - design fires performance-based





## What can we do?

- To ensure risk is:
  - acceptable
  - commensurate with scale
- To ensure strategies are:
  - appropriate for tall buildings
  - followed through in construction
- To ensure suitability / validity of:
  - test fires
  - design fire scenarios
  - design fires prescriptive
  - design fires performance-based
- Be proactive



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# conclusions



### **Conclusions** Parting questions

Collectively & individually...

- What are we trying to achieve?
- Are our methods for design, testing and implementation appropriate?
- Are they ready for the buildings of tomorrow?
- Can we be proactive to ensure that they are?



"... the choice of level of detail in any part of an engineering procedure must to some extent be governed by the crudest part of that procedure"

Elms, 1985



"The magic numbers embodied in regulations are accepted without any question whilst any engineering solution is subjected to a disproportionately high standard of proof."

M. Law, 1994



### Thank you

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